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Abstract: Peter van Inwagen famously offers a version of the luck objection to libertarianism 
called the ‘Rollback Argument.’ It involves a thought experiment in which God repeatedly rolls 
time backward to provide an agent with many opportunities to act in the same circumstance. 
Because the agent has the kind of freedom that affords her alternative possibilities at the moment 
of choice, she performs different actions in some of these opportunities. The upshot is that 
whichever action she performs in the actual-sequence is intuitively a matter of mere chance. I 
explore a new response to the Rollback Argument. If there are true counterfactuals of libertarian 
freedom, then the agent performs the same action each time she is placed in the same 
circumstance, because that is what she would freely do in that circumstance. This response 
appears to negate the chancy intuition. Ultimately, however, I argue that this new response is 
unsuccessful, because there is a variant of the Rollback Argument that presents the same basic 
challenge to the libertarian on the assumption that there are true counterfactuals of libertarian 
freedom. Thus, true counterfactuals of libertarian freedom do not provide the libertarian with a 












Libertarianism is the view that free will is incompatible with causal determinism and that human 
beings at least sometimes act freely. Randolph Clarke (2000: 23) classifies accounts of 
libertarianism as ‘action-centered’ if the indeterminism essential to libertarian freedom is located 
in the production of the decision—that is, at the moment of choice.1 According to this family of 
views, a free agent is able at least sometimes to choose between more than one possible course of 
action.2 Although many philosophers believe that the ability to do otherwise at the moment of 
choice is a desideratum of free action or even required for free action, others think that 
indeterminism at the moment of choice makes whichever action occurs lucky in a way that 
undermines freedom.  
Peter van Inwagen (2002) famously offers an intuitive version of the luck objection that 
has come to be known as the ‘Rollback Argument.’ The Rollback Argument is a thought 
experiment designed to show that the indeterminism essential to any kind of action-centered 
libertarian freedom rules out acting freely.3 Assume that Alice has some version of action-
centered libertarian freedom and that she finds herself torn in a difficult situation with strong 
reasons to tell the truth and strong reasons to lie (van Inwagen 2002: 171-175). Suppose that she 
tells the truth. Subsequently, God rolls time back to the moment t1 that is just prior to Alice’s 
telling the truth and allows time to move forward. What does Alice do this “second” time 
around? It is not the case that she must tell the truth. Given the same laws of nature and an 
identical past, she may perform a different action. It might be the case that she tells a lie, and it 
might be the case that she tells the truth again. Supposing that God rolls time back to t1 one 
hundred times and in each instance allows time to resume its forward momentum, it is extremely 
likely that sometimes Alice tells the truth and other times she lies. After enough rollbacks, the 
number of times she chooses to tell the truth and to tell a lie plausibly converges on some 
2 
 
definite ratio. Suppose that after the first 99 rollbacks, she tells the truth 68 times and tells a lie 
32 times. And after the next 900 rollbacks, she tells the truth 699 times and tells a lie 301 times. 
The probability of Alice’s telling the truth thus converges upon 0.7 and telling a lie upon 0.3. 
These objective probabilities are conditioned on the ratio of telling the truth and telling a lie in 
the rollbacks. 
  After watching Alice make her first 726 decisions in the same token circumstance, van 
Inwagen (2002: 172) contends that we should be left with the “inescapable impression” that what 
Alice does in the 727th rollback is a mere matter of chance—in this case a 70/30 chance.4 And 
there is no reason to resist this intuition, because all of Alice’s character, beliefs, and desires are 
held fixed up until the moment of choice. The only thing that differs in a rollback in which Alice 
tells the truth and a rollback in which she tells a lie is her bare exertion of will. Nothing about the 
agent herself explains why she performs one action rather than another. But if it is true that 
Alice’s action in the 727th rollback is a mere matter of chance, the same is true of her choice in 
the actual-sequence. And since an act’s occurring as a mere matter of chance rules out its being 
free, Alice does not act freely in the actual-sequence. The more general conclusion is that no 
action-centered libertarian act can be a free act, because the indeterminism that generates the 
freedom-undermining chanciness is common to every exercise of action-centered libertarian 
agency.5 
I explore a new response to the Rollback Argument. If a philosophical commitment of the 
Molinist view of divine providence is correct—namely, if there are true counterfactuals of 
libertarian freedom—then Alice performs the same action each time she is placed in the same 
circumstance.6 This response undermines the part of the thought experiment in which the agent 
chooses differently in the same circumstance. Thus, one might think that if there are true 
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counterfactuals of libertarian freedom, the Rollback Argument fails to show that the 
indeterminism essential to action-centered libertarian acts makes them too chancy to be free.7 
But a consideration from Dean Zimmerman’s (2009; 2011) anti-Molinist argument suggests that 
things are not so simple. By appealing to some of Zimmerman’s insights, we can construct an 
analogous thought experiment that presents the same basic challenge to the libertarian as the 
original Rollback Argument on the assumption there are true counterfactuals of libertarian 
freedom. As a result, true counterfactuals of libertarian freedom do not ultimately provide the 
libertarian with a solution to the Rollback Argument’s basic challenge. 
I proceed as follows. In the first section, I briefly state the standard response to the 
Rollback Argument and explain why it is dialectically desirable to look for a different kind of 
response. In the second section, I offer the Molinist Response that if there are true 
counterfactuals of libertarian freedom, then it is not the case that Alice tells the truth in some of 
the rollbacks but not in others, and thus there appears to be no reason to think that Alice’s action 
is chancy and unfree. In the third section, I explicate a variant of the Rollback Argument inspired 
by Zimmerman’s work and argue that the libertarian still faces the same potential problem even 
if there are true counterfactuals of libertarian freedom. 
I. THE STANDARD RESPONSE 
Proponents of the Standard Response to the Rollback Argument accept van Inwagen’s claims 
that are constitutive of the thought experiment, including the claim that if Alice’s action is 
indeterministic and if God repeatedly rolls time back, it is extremely likely that she would tell the 
truth in some of the rollbacks and would tell a lie in others. Proponents of the Standard 
Response, however, deny van Inwagen’s intuitive reaction to the thought experiment. In other 
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words, they deny his claim that Alice’s choosing differently in the rollbacks makes her actual-
sequence act chancy in a way that is inimical to acting freely.  
Some versions of the Standard Response appeal to agent causation to explain why Alice’s 
act is not too chancy to be free. For example, Randolph Clarke (2003: 166-167; 2005), Meghan 
Griffith (2005), and Timothy O’Connor and Jonathan D. Jacobs (2013: 189-190) all assert that 
Alice’s being the agent cause of her act rules out the claim that her act is too chancy to be free, 
because she is the source of her act in a way appropriate to have freedom-level control over it.8 
As O’Connor puts it: 
The agent causationist contends that ... [the Rollback Argument fails] to take seriously 
the concept of agent causation. ... Alice’s causing her intention to tell the truth is itself an 
exercise of control. And because, ex hypothesi, it is literally the agent herself generating 
the outcome, it is hard to see how the posited form of control could possibly be improved 
upon. So wherein lies the luck? (2011: 324) 
  
Other philosophers such as Michael Almeida and Mark Bernstein (2011: 487-490), Laura 
Ekstrom (2011: 374-377), John Martin Fischer (2012: 95-104), and Christopher Evan Franklin 
(2011: 215-219; 2012: 408-409) also contend that Alice’s action is not too chancy to be free but 
do so without appealing to agent causation.  
The dialectical problem with the Standard Response is that the debate bottoms out in 
conflicting intuitions about whether Alice’s action is chancy in a way that undermines freedom. 
After all, the Standard Response does not imply that there is a problem with the thought 
experiment; it implies only that van Inwagen’s intuitive reaction to the thought experiment is off-
target. To avoid this dialectical stalemate, it is profitable to pursue responses to the Rollback 
Argument that move beyond this conflict of intuitions. In the next section, I explore the Molinist 
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Response to the Rollback Argument, because it is the kind of response that challenges a claim 
that is partially constitutive of the thought experiment.9  
II. THE MOLINIST RESPONSE 
 
Molinism is a view of divine providence named after the sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuit Luis 
de Molina, and it describes God as having a strong kind of control over the action-centered 
libertarian free acts of his creatures. A distinctive feature of Molinism and the heart of the 
Molinist Response to the Rollback Argument is that there are eternally true counterfactuals of 
libertarian freedom.10 A counterfactual of libertarian freedom is a proposition of the following 
form: if agent S were in a complete circumstance c, S would freely (in the action-centered 
libertarian sense) x. With knowledge of what any person would freely do in any particular 
circumstance, God is able to actualize a possible world in which agents find themselves in 
circumstances that guarantee that they make particular free choices. God, thus, has significant 
control over the free actions of his creatures. Nevertheless, he does not have total control over 
their free actions, because the counterfactuals of creaturely libertarian freedom that are true are 
so independently of his will. 
Because it is entirely outside of God’s control which counterfactuals of creaturely 
libertarian freedom are true, the true counterfactuals delimit which possible worlds he can 
actualize. For each possible world that God can actualize containing creatures who sometimes 
act freely, there is a set of propositions that aptly describe each event in that world and those 
propositions must be consistent with the true counterfactuals of creaturely libertarian freedom. 
After all, it is absurd to claim that God can actualize a world in which the set of propositions that 
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describe that world’s events are inconsistent with the true counterfactuals of libertarian freedom. 
For example, consider the following counterfactual: 
 P: If Phil were in complete circumstance c, Phil would freely drink coffee.  
Assume that P is true. In that case, it is absurd to claim that God can actualize a possible world in 
which Phil freely refrains from drinking coffee in c, because he would freely drink coffee in c. 
Following Thomas Flint (1998: 51-54), we may call the possible worlds that the true 
counterfactuals permit God to actualize feasible worlds and the possible worlds that the true 
counterfactuals preclude God from actualizing infeasible worlds.11 It is important to see that 
infeasible worlds are still genuinely possible worlds. For P is merely contingently true. That is, 
~P could have been true. And if ~P were true, then God would have been able to actualize a 
world in which Phil is in c and freely refrains from drinking coffee. God’s knowledge of true 
counterfactuals of libertarian freedom, thus, grants him significant but not total control over the 
free actions of his creatures. 
We may now state the Molinist Response to the Rollback Argument. According to 
Molinism, there is a true counterfactual of libertarian freedom about what every possible agent 
would freely do in every circumstance in which it is possible for the agent to be.12 It follows that 
there is a true counterfactual about what Alice would freely do in the difficult situation 
(supposing for convenience that there are only two possible actions). It is either TRUTH or LIE: 
TRUTH: If Alice were in the difficult situation at t1, she would freely tell the truth. 
LIE: If Alice were in the difficult situation at t1, she would freely tell a lie. 
 
Assume that TRUTH is true. When Alice finds herself in the difficult situation, she tells the 
truth.13 And in the next rollback, she tells the truth again. In fact, in each instance of God’s 
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rolling time back to the difficult situation, the antecedent of TRUTH is satisfied and Alice tells 
the truth. Thus, Alice’s telling the truth has a conditional probability of 1.0, and this objective 
probability is conditioned on TRUTH.14 But because Alice’s telling the truth has a conditional 
probability of 1.0, no one should be left with the intuition that her telling the truth is a mere 
matter of chance.15 That is, if we were to watch Alice tell the truth 726 times in a row, no one 
should have the intuition that what she does in her next rollback will be a mere matter of chance. 
So, the Molinist Response appears to rule out the chancy intuition, because it implies the denial 
of van Inwagen’s claim that if Alice’s action is indeterministic and if God repeatedly rolls time 
back, she would tell the truth in some of the rollbacks and would tell a lie in others. This 
response generalizes. For all actual persons, actual circumstances, and rollbacks, each person 
freely duplicates their “original” free decision. Therefore, if there are true counterfactuals of 
libertarian freedom, it appears that the Rollback Argument fails to show that action-centered 
libertarian acts are chancy in a way that is contrary to acting freely. 16 
 Nevertheless, the Molinist Response will be successful only if there is no variant of the 
Rollback Argument that presents the same basic challenge to the libertarian on the assumption 
that there are true counterfactuals of libertarian freedom. In the next section, I argue that there is 
such a thought experiment by appealing to some of Zimmerman’s work on the antecedents of 
counterfactuals of libertarian freedom. 
III. WHY THE MOLINIST RESPONSE FAILS 
The antecedent of a counterfactual of libertarian freedom describes an agent’s being in a 
complete circumstance—that is, a maximally specific circumstance that includes the entire 
history of the world (Flint 1998: 46). As such, any small difference in remote history suffices to 
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individuate a new token complete circumstance. Zimmerman (2009: 67) recognizes that there are 
many true counterfactuals of libertarian freedom that describe an agent in the same type of 
complete circumstance, and these type-identical complete circumstances differ in only remotely 
historical and causally irrelevant ways. So, there are lots of token complete circumstances that 
are exactly similar for all practical purposes to Alice’s actual difficult situation but differ only 
by, for example, an angel’s singing prior to creation or a swerve of dust prior to the Big Bang 
(Zimmerman 2009: 60-61). Here are three groups of counterfactuals with type-identical but 
token-distinct complete circumstances: 
TRUTH: If Alice were in the difficult situation at t1, she would freely tell the truth. 
LIE: If Alice were in the difficult situation at t1, she would freely lie. 
 
TRUTH*: If Alice were in the difficult situation* at t1, which differs from the difficult 
situation by only an angel’s singing prior to creation, she would freely tell the truth. 
LIE*: If Alice were in the difficult situation* at t1, which differs from the difficult 
situation by only an angel’s singing prior to creation, she would freely lie. 
 
TRUTH**: If Alice were in the difficult situation** at t1, which differs from the difficult 
situation by only a swerve of dust prior to the Big Bang, she would freely tell the truth. 
LIE**: If Alice were in the difficult situation** at t1, which differs from the difficult 
situation by only a swerve of dust prior to the Big Bang, she would freely lie. 
 
 
It is possible that TRUTH, TRUTH*, and LIE** are all true (and so possible that LIE, LIE*, and 
TRUTH** are all false), because the truth-value of each counterfactual of freedom with a 
different token complete circumstance is logically independent from all the others. Thus, it is not 
the case that TRUTH’s being true necessitates that TRUTH*, TRUTH**, TRUTH***, and so on 
are also true. But if it is the case that both TRUTH and LIE** are true, then God can ensure that 
Alice either tells the truth or tells a lie in that type of circumstance by actualizing a possible 
world in which either the difficult situation or the difficult situation** obtains. So, if the true 
counterfactuals turn out in this way for all possible persons and for every possible type of 
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complete circumstance, each possible person will be what Zimmerman (2009: 67) calls 
“transworldly manipulable,” because God can ensure what action each person performs for every 
type of complete circumstance.17 
 In light of Alice’s possible transworldly manipulability, we may consider a new thought 
experiment that presents the same basic challenge to the libertarian as the original Rollback 
Argument. Suppose that TRUTH is true and that we watch Alice tell the truth in the difficult 
situation. Subsequently, “we can imagine being presented with an array of monitors that present 
dramatic (yet accurate) representations of the outcome of Alice’s identical process of 
deliberation in different possible worlds” (Franklin 2012: 407). For our purposes, the only 
possible worlds relevant to being displayed on the monitors are feasible worlds in which Alice is 
in type-identical complete circumstances. For in those worlds only is Alice in circumstances that 
are indistinguishable from her actual difficult situation, and in those worlds only does Alice’s 
action correspond to what she would in fact freely do. 
As we watch the monitors, what would we see? Possibly, we see Alice telling the truth in 
some of the monitors and telling a lie in others, because the truth-values of counterfactuals of 
libertarian freedom with token-distinct complete circumstances are logically independent of one 
another. As a result, true counterfactuals of libertarian freedom do not guarantee that Alice tells 
the truth in each monitor. In fact, given that TRUTH is true, it seems overwhelmingly likely that 
at least one of the counterfactuals LIE*, LIE**, LIE***, or LIE**** and so on is also true, 
because Alice is torn between truth-telling and lying in the difficult situation; and these other 
complete circumstances are indistinguishable from her actual circumstance (cf. Swinburne 2013: 
206). So, it is very plausible that we see Alice tell the truth and then observe Alice tell a lie in at 
least some of the monitors. But then, after watching Alice sometimes telling the truth and 
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sometimes telling a lie, we plausibly will be left with whatever intuition we are left with in the 
original Rollback Argument.18 
Whether this new thought experiment succeeds in showing that true counterfactuals of 
libertarian freedom provide the libertarian with no answer to the Rollback Argument depends on 
how similar it is to the original thought experiment. I contend that the similarities are striking. In 
the original thought experiment, it is the case that Alice would probably tell the truth and would 
probably tell a lie in the same token complete circumstance, and, in the new thought experiment, 
it is probably the case that Alice would freely tell the truth and that Alice would freely tell a lie 
in type-identical but token-distinct complete circumstances.19 In other words, both thought 
experiments illustrate what would probably happen if Alice was repeatedly given opportunities 
to act in indistinguishable circumstances. 
But one might object that there is a relevant difference between these thought 
experiments. One might object that we get a stronger chancy intuition in the original thought 
experiment than in the new thought experiment, because Alice is acting in the same token 
complete circumstance rather than in merely type-identical complete circumstances. But this 
assertion seems implausible. After all, the type-identical complete circumstances are objectively 
and phenomenologically indistinguishable from Alice’s actual difficult situation in every way 
relevant to her performing one action or another. They differ in only historically remote and 
causally irrelevant ways. Thus, the mere fact that the new thought experiment has Alice in 
merely type-identical circumstances for each rollback and the original thought experiment has 





I began by arguing that the Standard Response to the Rollback Argument is dialectically 
undesirable, because it does not dispute a feature of the thought experiment but merely rejects 
the chancy intuition. Next, I argued that one might think that the Molinist Response is a more 
dialectically advantageous response, because it disputes van Inwagen’s claim that if Alice’s 
action is indeterministic and God repeatedly rolls time back, she would tell the truth in some of 
the rollbacks and would tell a lie in others. And since that claim’s being true is essential for 
generating the chancy intuition, it appears that the Molinist Response undermines the Rollback 
Argument. Finally, I argued that we can devise a new thought experiment using Zimmerman’s 
insights that issues the same basic challenge to the libertarian as the original Rollback Argument 
on the assumption that there are true counterfactuals of libertarian freedom. Therefore, true 
counterfactuals of libertarian freedom do not ultimately provide the libertarian with an answer to 
the Rollback Argument.20 
1 Non-action-centered accounts of libertarianism locate the indeterminism somewhere further upstream 
from the choice such as during deliberation. See Mele 2006: 105-135; Stump 2003: 277-306. 
2 The qualifier ‘at least sometimes’ makes room for action-centered accounts of libertarianism such as 
Robert Kane’s (1996) in which some but not all free actions are indeterministic. 
3 Van Inwagen (2002: 168) assumes that Alice has agent causal power, because his ultimate aim is to 
falsify the widespread assumption that agent causal accounts of action-centered libertarianism do circumvent the 
luck objection but event causal accounts of action-centered libertarianism do not. That is, he aims to show that the 
luck objection to libertarianism is as problematic for agent causal varieties of libertarianism as it is for event causal 
varieties. Even so, the Rollback Argument may be viewed as an argument that no version of action-centered 
libertarianism is compatible with freedom. See Buchak 2013: 21. 
4 Franklin (2012: 407) also construes the thought experiment as Alice being in the same token circumstance 
for each rollback. But one might think that Alice finds herself in merely type-identical future circumstances. There is 
good reason, I think, not to characterize the thought experiment in that way. Alice plausibly cannot find herself in a 
type-identical future circumstance, because her telling the truth in the original circumstance has two effects on her. 
Her action ennobles her character, and it furnishes her with knowledge about what it is like to tell the truth in that 
circumstance and what consequences follow. See Kane 1996: 179-181, 145-156. Thus, Alice’s dispositional states 
and informational input will not be the same when God constructs a new future circumstance. To avoid this 
problem, one might suppose that a rollback amounts to the annihilation of the world and its future re-creation to 
mirror the moment at which Alice is in the difficult circumstance. If God annihilates and re-creates the world in the 
first rollback, then Alice would be what Michael McKenna (2004: 180) calls an “instant agent,” that is, an agent 
who begins her existence in adulthood with intellect, character, and beliefs that exactly mirror the annihilated agent. 
On this characterization of the thought experiment, however, it is not obvious that Alice is the same person in each 
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rollback. See van Inwagen 1978: 118-119. And since the luck objection is not supposed to depend on the falsity of a 
prominent view of personal identity, this formulation is unduly contentious. 
5 Van Inwagen (2002: 175) believes that there is something wrong with this argument, but it is not clear to 
him what the mistake is. 
6 Counterfactuals of freedom are perhaps more aptly named ‘subjunctive conditionals of freedom,’ because 
counterfactuals of freedom with antecedents that obtain in the actual world are not contrary-to-fact. I retain the 
conventional mode of reference. 
7 I do not evaluate the claim that there are true counterfactuals of libertarian freedom. I do, however, note a 
few issues along the way. For thorough and opinionated introductions to these issues, see Hasker 2011; Flint 2011; 
Perszyk 2013. 
8 Clarke is no longer a proponent of agent causal libertarianism. 
9 Some other responses to the Rollback Argument also evade this conflict of intuitions. For example, 
Franklin (2012: 406-407) argues that because the Rollback Argument is metaphysically impossible, any chancy 
intuition that it elicits is invalid. Additionally, both Richard Swinburne (2013: 206-208) and Lara Buchak (2013: 24) 
dispute van Inwagen’s claim that the ratio of Alice’s telling the truth and telling a lie eventually converges on a 
definite value. And because this convergence is essential for eliciting the chancy intuition, Alice’s act does not even 
appear to be a mere matter of chance. 
10 The fact that counterfactuals of freedom are true prior to the birth of the agent that they describe raises 
several problems for Molinism including the Grounding Objection. Roughly, the Grounding Objection is that 
Molinist counterfactuals must be true without being grounded in the concrete world but no proposition can be 
groundlessly true (Adams 1977). Interestingly, the Grounding Objection has some affinity to the luck objection to 
libertarianism itself. Because TRUTH is true of Alice in a groundless way, one might think that it is a matter of luck 
whether it is TRUTH or LIE that is true of her. In fact, Neal Tognazzini (2015) formulates a version of the luck 
objection to libertarianism based on the ungrounded nature of libertarian acts themselves. 
11 God himself is subject to circumstantial moral luck if there are true counterfactuals of libertarian 
freedom, because it is a matter of luck for him which possible worlds he can actualize. See Hartman 2014: 85. 
12 The law of the conditional excluded middle, which is often accepted by Molinists, states that for any 
counterfactual of freedom, either it or its logical complement is true (Flint 1998: 48-50; Fredosso 1988: 50). 
13 For an interesting discussion about the relationship between why a counterfactual of libertarian freedom 
is true and why the libertarian free act that it describes occurs, see Alexander Pruss and Joshua Rasmussen 2014.  
14 One might doubt that Alice’s action is genuinely indeterministic on account of its conditional probability 
of 1.0 based on TRUTH. The laws of nature, however, do not rule out an indeterministic event with a propensity to 
produce more than one outcome from being repeated many times and yet always producing the same outcome. 
Furthermore, Alice’s telling the truth and telling a lie each has a conditional probability of less than 1.0 based on 
features of the agent in a circumstance, because her reasons, desires, and habits in that circumstance non-
deterministically incline her to bring about each possible action. So, Alice’s telling the truth has a conditional 
probability of 1.0 based on TRUTH and has a conditional probability of less than 1.0 based on features of her in that 
circumstance. 
15 According to the Molinist, Alice had the ability to lie in the difficult circumstance. And if she were to 
have told a lie, the counterfactual LIE would have been true of her. So, it is up to Alice to do something such that 
had she done it, a different counterfactual of freedom would have been true of her (Flint 2011: 43). Nevertheless, 
several philosophers maintain that true counterfactuals of libertarian freedom are in tension with libertarianism itself 
or with motivations for libertarianism (Adams 1977; Cohen 2015; Cohen 2016; Hasker 1999; Perszyk 2003). For 
Molinist responses to some of these arguments, see Flint 1998: 138-178; Wierenga 2011: 131-135. 
16 One might think that Alice is not in the same token complete circumstance in each rollback, because any 
small difference in history suffices to individuate a new token complete circumstance and the number of times God 
reverts the world changes in each rollback. So, one might think that Alice finds herself in a token-distinct but type-
identical complete circumstance in her first rollback and every subsequent rollback. Nevertheless, this objection 
goes wrong by focusing on the metaphysics of the impossible—namely, God’s changing the past. The Rollback 
Argument does not attempt to represent a way in which the world could be, but is merely a heuristic to help us grasp 
the nature of action-centered libertarian agency. In particular, the heuristic describes three features of action-
centered libertarian agency: the indeterminism essential to free agency precludes there from being a single action 
that an agent would freely do in a particular circumstance; the agent would probably perform different actions if per 
impossibile she were to be given many opportunities to act in the same circumstance; and nothing about the agent 
explains why she acts one way rather than another (van Inwagen 2002: 172; van Inwagen 1997: 227). The Molinist 
Response undermines the heuristic by denying the first claim. As a result, the original heuristic does not properly 
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describe action-centered libertarianism, which implies that the heuristic is defective. And if we revise the heuristic in 
light of the Molinist account of action-centered libertarian agency, Alice always tells the truth, and the revised 
thought experiment does not elicit the chancy impression. 
17 Here is a summary of Zimmerman’s anti-Molinist argument. Zimmerman (2009; 2011) argues that a 
certain kind of combination of true counterfactuals of libertarian freedom about a person rules out her being a free 
agent. It is helpful to divide the argument into two stages. First, Zimmerman (2009: 48-75) argues that it is possible 
that the true counterfactuals of libertarian freedom about a person turn out such that the agent would freely perform 
different kinds of actions in type-identical but token-distinct complete circumstances. This claim generalizes to all 
possible persons. Second, Zimmerman (2009: 75-84) argues that if the true counterfactuals turn out that way, then 
God can manipulate which of several kinds of actions any person performs in any type of complete circumstance, 
and this kind of global divine control is intuitively incompatible with being a free agent. For our purposes, only the 
first part is relevant. Molinists tend to accept the first part and focus their criticism on the second. See Craig 2011: 
158-161; Wierenga 2011: 136-138. 
18 If it is integral to the Rollback Argument that the ratio of telling the truth and telling a lie converges on a 
definite value, then we can add to the thought experiment a similar convergence for the counterfactuals of freedom 
with type-identical antecedents as we consider more of them. 
19 In the original thought experiment, the form of the counterfactual is ‘If S were in complete circumstance 
c, S would probably freely x,’ and, in the revised thought experiment, the form of the counterfactual is ‘It is 
probably the case that if S were in complete circumstance c, S would freely x.’ For a discussion of these kinds of 
counterfactuals, see Hartman 2017: 75-78. 
20 I thank Joel Archer, Yishai Cohen, Thomas Flint, John Greco, Jonathan Jacobs, Gideon Jeffrey, Josh 
Johnson, Andrew Kissel, Joshua Rasmussen, Michael Rota, Dan Sheffler, Eleonore Stump, Harrison Waldo, and 
Dean Zimmerman for comments and conversations about the central idea of this essay. Additionally, I am very 
grateful to two referees from this journal for excellent comments that greatly improved this paper. Finally, I thank 
audiences at the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, Midwest Meeting of the Society for 
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